



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

It is unnecessary to say that nothing is *proved*. That Russia has been unprosperous as admitted by all apologists for bolshevism; that the country would have had difficulties of the most serious sort under any government applying any theories is also indisputable. It is simply impossible to tell what the separate effects of either the political or the economic system of the Communist government have been. And even if this problem could be solved it would not prove anything as to the long-run effects of the same policies under normal conditions. But Mr. Pasvolsky has performed a thoroughly praiseworthy and unique work in getting and presenting the facts.

To the reviewer (who is doubtless not uninfluenced by the previous conviction that any highly integrated organization of large numbers of human beings is impossible except temporarily and for very special and concrete purposes), the "lesson" of the book is that the failure of bolshevism is simply the failure of coercion. The Communist government of Russia has labored prodigiously and heroically at an impossible task. Men must be led as if you led them not, and "direct action" is always based upon poor psychology. Specifically, in relation to economic policy, the Communists of Russia (the Bolsheviks) have tried to *control* production, and then to control distribution and consumption in relation to production. If any large measure of "control" in the direct sense is costly and impracticable, it is surely true in addition that this is the wrong order of procedure for an economic authority in endeavoring to get its people to do what they should instead of what they wish. This is perhaps the most fundamental failure of radicals generally to do justice to the competitive system. It does give the people nominal freedom, at least the illusion of freedom in directing their consumption and to some extent it does control production and distribution (more or less) *in relation to consumption*, without recourse to compulsion of a crude sort.

FRANK H. KNIGHT

UNIVERSITY OF IOWA

A Proposal for an Unemployment Fund in the Men's Clothing Industry. By LEO WOLMAN, Chief of the Research Department of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America. No. 5 of the Amalgamated Education Pamphlets, published by the A.C.W. of A., 1922. Pp. 27.

This pamphlet summarizes the argument for a scheme of unemployment insurance so designed as to throw the initial burden of

unemployment cost on the shoulders of the employing group in the particular industry. Making each industry responsible for its own unemployment, so the argument runs, will avoid the weakness of most state unemployment schemes abroad by focusing attention on eliminating the causes of the evil rather than on alleviating the distress of the individual workman. An unemployment fund, assessed on employers in proportion to their responsibility, will force preventive action by those who are in a position to control employment. This direct tax, whatever its ultimate incidence, will force better planning, more efficient organization and more intelligent direction of industry.

Mr. Wolman's pamphlet admits that the causes of unemployment lie in part beyond the jurisdiction of the individual industry, but argues that the more serious factors can in large measure be controlled within that jurisdiction and that progress is to be sought through experimentation by industries, leaving more general supplementary measures to follow.

Such in general is the brief for an unemployment scheme for the clothing industry. With the argument and the general theory underlying it few students of industrial organization will be inclined to quarrel seriously. The trend of experimentation abroad at present, especially in England, is in this direction, and there are now some precedents on which to build. More than this it is impossible to say until the present pamphlet, which undoubtedly has educational value, is followed by another in which the administrative details of the proposal are completely worked out.

C. N. HITCHCOCK

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

The High Cost of Strikes. By MARSHALL OLDS. New York: Putnam and Sons, 1921. Pp. xx+286.

A glance at the opening paragraphs of chapters chosen at random in this book reveals such statements as this:

CHAPTER II—

When you had to pay \$55.00, \$65.00 or \$75.00 for a suit of clothes during 1919-20, about \$20.00 or \$30.00 of that price was due to strikes.

CHAPTER V—

Coal cost \$3.75 a ton at the mine in July 1920. This price included the cost and profit to the operator and all labor cost of mining, including the making the product ready for the ultimate consumer. Yet at exactly